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Rightly Dividing the Domestic
Jihadist from the Enemy
Combatant in the “War Against
al-Qaeda”—Why It Matters in
Rendition and Targeted Killing
Jeffrey F. Addicott *
The confusion associated with comprehending fundamental
legal concepts associated with how America conducts the “War
on Terror” centers around the unwillingness of the U.S.
government to properly distinguish al-Qaeda unlawful enemy
combatants from domestic jihadi terrorists. If the American
government cannot properly differentiate between an enemy
combatant and a domestic criminal, it is little wonder that
attendant legal positions associated with investigation
techniques, targeted killing, arrest, detention, rendition, trial,
and interrogation are subject to never-ending debate. While all
al-Qaeda unlawful enemy combatants can be labeled as violent
jihadists, not all violent jihadists are unlawful enemy
combatants.
Without a significant about face in leadership that is
willing to discern the basic difference between an unlawful
enemy combatant and a domestic criminal, America’s
reputation will remain under a cloud of suspicion and confusion
regarding the legality of our actions associated with two
significant areas of critique: rendition and targeted killing vis-àvis unlawful enemy combatants in the War on Terror.
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I. Introduction
“Decisions about who, where and how to prosecute have always
been—and must remain—the responsibility of the executive branch.” 1
—Eric Holder
With the devastating terror attacks of September 11, 2001 by alQaeda unlawful enemy combatants 2 on the United States, terrorism is
no longer exclusively just another criminal offense to be investigated
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and handed over to an
Assistant U.S. Attorney for prosecution. 3 If the terror attack is carried
out by an unlawful enemy combatant, the proper rule of law is not
domestic criminal law, but the law of war. This simple common sense
distinction is largely lost on a bilious sea of political and ideological
distortion. Whatever else the eleventh anniversary of the al-Qaeda
terror attacks of September 11, 20014 signifies, it is unfortunate that
1.

Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Statement of the Attorney General on the
Prosecution of the 9/11 Conspirators (Apr. 4, 2011), available at http://
www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2011/ag-speech-110404.html.

2.

See infra Part II(C).

3.

See Wayne Zaideman, Fortifying Legal Approaches to the War on
Terror: Methodologic Considerations, in PERSPECTIVES ON DETENTION,
PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT OF TERRORISTS IMPLICATIONS FOR
FUTURE POLICY AND CONDUCT 23 (Yonah Alexander et al. eds., 2011)
(arguing that after the 9/11 attacks, the government elevated
counterterrorism as the first priority of the FBI in order to stop terror
attacks on the United States before they occur).

4.

See generally 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED
STATES 1–46 (2004) (setting out a final analysis by the United States
government of all the issues associated with the 9/11 attacks by al-
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well after the passage of a full decade there still remains great public
confusion when it comes to comprehending fundamental legal
concepts associated with how America conducts the War Against alQaeda, 5 more popularly referred to by the non-descriptive Bush-era
phrase: “War on Terror.” 6 While some may argue that the fault for
this obfuscation rests with the lack of international consensus on
relevant standards that should be adopted to deal with international
terrorism 7 in asymmetric warfare, 8 or that the Bush-created phrase
War on Terror itself is horribly vague, 9 the root cause of this so-called
Qaeda. On September 11, 2001, 19 members of the radical Islamic terror
group named al-Qaeda hijacked four U.S. passenger aircraft while in
flight (five terrorists each in three of the planes and four in the fourth
that went down in Pennsylvania). The al-Qaeda foot soldiers
intentionally crashed two of the aircraft into the Twin Towers of the
World Trade Center in New York City. A third aircraft targeted the
Pentagon in Northern Virginia. The fourth plane, United 93, went down
in a field in Pennsylvania, most likely as a result of the heroic efforts of
some of the passengers who stormed the al-Qaeda pilots. Almost 3,000
people were killed in the attacks. Id.
5.

President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Strengthening
Intelligence and Aviation Security (Jan. 7, 2010), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-strengtheningintelligence-and-aviation-security (“We are at war. We are at war
against al Qaeda, a far reaching network of violence and hatred that
attacked us on 9/11, that killed nearly 3,000 innocent people and that is
plotting to strike us again. And we will do whatever it takes to defeat
them.”); see also 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4.

6.

President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and
the American People (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.jThe
term War on Terror was coined during the Bush Administration.
President George W. Bush stated, “On September 11th, enemies of
freedom committed an act of war against our country.” Id.

7.

See John F. Murphy, The Control of International Terrorism, in
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 458–61 (John Norton Moore & Robert F.
Turner eds., 2005). As of this writing, there is no international definition
of terrorism. Numerous attempts have been made over the years to
develop an international definition for the term. Professor Murphy
argues there is a need for an internationally accepted definition of
terrorism to enforce laws against terrorist attacks.

8.

See Bryan Bender, DIA Chief Predicts Rise in “Asymmetric” Warfare,
DEFENSE DAILY, Sept. 12, 1996. The term asymmetric warfare is of
recent origin. It generally refers to unconventional conflicts against
enemies that do not wear uniforms or follow the law of war.

9.

See Jeffrey F. Addicott, Efficacy of the Obama Policies to Combat AlQa’eda, the Taliban, and Associated Forces—The First Year, 30 PACE
L. REV. 340, 362–63 (2010) (discussing the confusion associated with the
term War on Terror and supporting an Obama term “War Against AlQa’eda” as better suited to describe the conflict).
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conundrum actually centers around the unwillingness of the United
States government to properly distinguish al-Qaeda unlawful enemy
combatant terrorists from domestic jihadi terrorists. 10
Instead, the terms “domestic terrorist,” “domestic jihadist,” or
just “terrorist” are frequently employed to describe all categories of
actors—unlawful enemy combatants as well as common criminals—
leaving both domestic and international audiences puzzled as to what
should be the proper rule of law to apply to a given act of terror. If
the American government cannot properly differentiate between an
enemy combatant and a domestic criminal, it is little wonder that
attendant legal positions associated with investigation techniques,
targeted killing, arrest, detention, rendition, trial, and interrogation
are subject to never-ending debate. For instance, one interesting and
overriding issue that perplexes is not whether rendition or targeted
killing is lawful against unlawful enemy combatants—they certainly
are—but, why it is so difficult to discern the unlawful enemy
combatant from the domestic criminal? Is it really just a matter of
sloppy thinking leading to sloppy application of the proper rule of
law?
To be certain, the term terrorism carries with it tremendous
definitional baggage. Despite the many descriptive uses of the term
terrorism, it is and always will be a tactic, not an ideology. 11 From a
historical perspective, the threat of terrorism is nothing new. Terror
as a tactic is as old as human history. Similarly, those who engage in
terrorism as a tactical use of violence can emanate from a variety of
ideological sources, including political, social, economic, or religious.12
As such, popular labels that incorporate the word terrorist to describe
groups or individuals include such phrases as, “right-wing terrorists,”13
10.

See JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL41416,
AMERICAN JIHADIST TERRORISM: COMBATING A COMPLEX THREAT 1
(2010) (explaining that the term jihadist describes an individual who
employs the religion of Islam to justify the desire to establish a world
which is governed by a Muslim civil and religious system known as a
caliphate). See also Devlin Barrett, Siobhan Gorman & Tamer ElGhobashy, Bin Laden Kin Nabbed, Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 2013, at A1.

11.

See CALEB CARR, THE LESSONS OF TERROR: A HISTORY OF WARFARE
AGAINST CIVILIANS 17–30 (2002) (discussing how terrorism is a tactic
associated with violence in war and peace).

12.

See id. at 16.

13.

See Michael A. Newton, Exceptional Engagement: Protocol I and A
World United Against Terrorism, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 323, 343 n.92
(2009) (citing EDWARD F. MICKOLUS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
IN
THE
1980S: VOLUME II 1984–1987 XIII (1989) (“Rightwing terrorism refers to acts perpetrated by outlawed groups that do
not seek a social revolution but resort to violence as a way to express
and advance their political goals, such as ultra nationalism and
anticommunism.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY
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“left-wing terrorists,” 14 or “eco-terrorists.” 15 That said, the number
one threat facing the United States comes from an
ideologically/religiously linked confederation of radicalized violent
Islamic jihadists who engage in illegal violence by means of
terrorism. 16 Some of these jihadists qualify as unlawful enemy
combatants and some do not. While all al-Qaeda unlawful enemy
combatants can be labeled as “violent jihadists,” 17 not all violent
jihadists are unlawful enemy combatants. In this light, violent
jihadists that do not qualify as unlawful enemy combatants must be
deemed domestic terrorists, but violent jihadists that do qualify as
unlawful enemy combatants must not be labeled as domestic
terrorists. Out of all of the nascent legal and policy issues associated
with the armed conflict against al-Qaeda, no factor has spawned more
public or political rhetoric. If this separation was understood and

ASSESSMENT, RIGHTWING EXTREMISM: CURRENT ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL CLIMATE FUELING RESURGENCE IN RADICALIZATION AND
RECRUITMENT (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/
rightwing.pdf. The Department of Homeland Security Report not only
labeled as right-wing extremists those individuals who are hate-oriented
towards minorities and entertain a dislike for large centralized federal
government authority, but also cautioned law enforcement to be aware
that returning military combat veterans, those dissatisfied with the
manner in which the federal government is handling the security of the
border, and even people that inordinately embrace limited government
might also be ripe for recruitment by right-wing extremist groups. See
id. at 2.
14.

See BRENT L. SMITH, TERRORISM IN AMERICA: PIPE BOMBS AND PIPE
DREAMS 24–25 (1994). Left-wing terrorists are generally characterized
by an extreme sense of utopian egalitarianism, an extreme hatred of
nationalism, an extreme opposition to free market capitalism, and an
overt opposition to the armed forces. See id.

15.

See Rebecca K. Smith, “Ecoterrorism”?: A Critical Analysis of the
Vilification of Radical Environmental Activists As Terrorists, 38 ENVTL.
L. 537, 545–46 (2008). Eco-terrorists are generally characterized by an
extreme dedication to protecting the so-called natural environment by
targeting businesses and government agencies they perceive as engaging
in actions that disrupt or harm the environment. Smith’s article
discusses the rise of the term “eco-terrorism” and how law enforcement
responds to the threat. Eco-terrorists use threats and violence against
people or property for environmental reasons, often symbolically. See
also Joshua K. Marquis & Danielle M. Weiss, Eco-Terror: Special
Interest Terrorism, PROSECUTOR, Jan. 2005, at 30 (discussing the
underground radical eco-terrorist group, The Earth Liberation Front).

16.

See BJELOPERA, supra note 10, at 1–2.

17.

See id. at 2 (describing violent jihadist as a synonym for “violent action
taken on the basis of radical or extremist beliefs”).
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applied, many of the legal and policy questions would quickly fall into
place with little or no dissent. 18
The inability to set bright lines of distinction between al-Qaeda
unlawful enemy combatants and domestic jihadists is not just a
failure in definition; it is a failure in leadership and does tremendous
damage to America’s commitment to abide by the proper rule of
law. 19 The United States must be able to clearly distinguish between
common criminals and unlawful enemy combatants and then apply
the appropriate rule of law to each category with unabashed clarity.
The purpose of this article is to make this distinction and to forcefully
argue that in its second term, the Obama Administration must
drastically improve its dismal performance in articulating and
communicating that distinction to the public. Without a significant
about face in leadership that can actually discern the basic difference
between an unlawful enemy combatant and a domestic criminal,
America’s reputation will remain under a cloud of suspicion and
confusion regarding the legality of our actions associated with two
significant areas of critique: rendition and targeted killing vis-à-vis
unlawful enemy combatants in the War Against al-Qaeda.

II. Definitions
Semantics is the study of the meaning of words. Nowhere is this
discipline more critical than in the field of jurisprudence. The
hallmark of any constitutional democracy is its firm commitment to
the law, and so it is absolutely imperative that the correct rule of law
be applied to the proper set of factual circumstances. In turn, before
an intelligent discussion of an issue can take place, it is imperative
that the terms of the discussion rest on solid definitions. When it
comes to rightly dividing the differences in legal treatment between
enemy combatants and domestic terrorists, this entails a general
understanding of at least four key categories of concern: (1) global
definition of terrorism; (2) American definitions of terrorism; (3)
differentiating the enemy combatant from the unlawful enemy
combatant; and (4) defining the domestic jihadist. Once these terms
18.

Terrorism, Rights, and National Security—A Debate on the Rights and
Treatment of Terrorism Suspects Held by the U.S. (JURIST Student
Assoc. & Uni. Pittsburgh Sch. L., Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.law.
pitt.edu/media/video/6495. Jeffrey Addicott debated Susan Herman,
President of the American Civil Liberties Union at a JURIST event.
Addicott argued that if the United States was in an international armed
conflict, then all of the activities conducted by the United States—from
detention to targeted killing—was lawful.

19.

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1448 (9th ed. 2009). The rule of law is
defined in Black’s as a “substantive legal principle” and “[t]he doctrine
that every person is subject to the ordinary law within the jurisdiction.”
Id.
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are set, then the issues of rendition and targeted killing can be
understood in their proper light.
A.

Global Definition of Terrorism

At the start of the discussion, the basic agreement of what the
concept “terrorism” means from a global perspective is of the utmost
priority. Unfortunately, as many commentators have discovered when
researching this matter, consensus is not possible. While the word
terrorism has been firmly stamped in the world’s general lexicon,
there is still no specific international consensus for what the word
actually means. 20 This state of affairs is unfortunate because it allows
for the word “terrorist” to be freely interchanged with the word
“unlawful enemy combatant” or “common criminal.” In large
measure, the lack of consensus reflects the perennial friction between
competing national interests, but the factor of “one man’s terrorist is
another man’s freedom fighter” 21 represents more than simply another
misguided postmodernist expression. For instance, murders committed
by the Iranian-backed Hamas 22 suicide bombers in Israel against
Jewish civilians are praised by some as great heroes of martyrdom.23
In the field of promoting a “just cause,” e.g., the destruction of the
State of Israel, the murders employ the old saw that the ends always
justify the means. 24 To the reasonable mind, suicide bombers are
nothing but murderers, no matter what the cause represented. A just
cause cannot be advanced by the intentional murder of innocent
civilians. 25
20.

See JEFFREY F. ADDICOTT, TERRORISM LAW: MATERIALS, CASES,
COMMENTS 1–3 (6th ed. 2011); see also Gabriel Soll, Terrorism: The
Known Element No One Can Define, 11 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. &
DISP. RESOL. 123, 132 (2004).

21.

James J. Ward, The Root of All Evil: Expanding Criminal Liability for
Providing Material Support to Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 471, 489
(2008). See also Murphy supra note 7, at 458 (discussing the concept of
labels for those who employ violence in the name of a particular cause).

22.

For an excellent discussion on the terror organization Hamas, see
MATTHEW LEVITT, HAMAS: POLITICS, CHARITY, AND TERRORISM IN THE
SERVICE OF JIHAD (2006) (describing the origin and purpose of the
terrorist organization).

23.

See Walter Reich, The Enemy at the Gates, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2004,
at 14; see also J.S. Piven, Psychological, Theological, and
Thanatological Aspects of Suicidal Terrorism, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L
L. 731, 733 (2008).

24.

See Igor Primoratz, Terrorism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/terrorism/ (last updated
Aug. 8, 2011).

25.

See Jeffrey F. Addicott, Operation Desert Storm: R.E. Lee or W.T.
Sherman?, 136 MILITARY L. REV. 115 (1992) (reprinted in COMMAND
MAG., July-Aug. 1992, at 38) (describing and detailing the war crimes
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Understanding the need for a global definition on terrorism and
the barrier posed by the related issue of the just cause syndrome, the
former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan,
expended great effort in carving out a lucid definition for terrorism
that would be palatable to the international community.
Concentrating on the innocent civilian victims of terror, Annan
offered a very short and precise definition of terrorism that eliminated
any mention of a justification for the “cause” that motivated the act
of terror. Following the long-standing logic for outlawing “war crimes”
via international treaty, which does not allow any exceptions
whatsoever to excuse grave breaches of the law of war, 26 Annan
proposed the following for adoption:
Any action constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause death
or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the
purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a
Government or an international organization to do or abstain
from doing any act. 27

Unfortunately, the 2005 vote on adoption of this definition by the
world body was squashed. The General Assembly of the United
Nations was unable to reach consensus due in large part to the fiftysix member Organization of Islamic Cooperation (all Muslim nations)
who insisted that any international definition of terrorism contain a

committed by the Lincoln Administration against Southern civilian
populations during the War Between the States).
26.

See generally The Geneva Conventions of 1949, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS
(ICRC), http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/genevaconven
tions (last visited Feb. 23, 2013). The primary international treaties
dealing with law of war violations for crimes committed during armed
conflict are the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The Geneva Conventions are
set out in four interrelated categories: (1) Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; (2) Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick,
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; (3) Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention III]; and (4) Geneva Convention Relative to the Protections
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. All
violations of that body of law related to international armed conflict are
labeled war crimes and depending on the severity of the crime and are
classified as either grave breaches of the law of war or simple breaches of
the law of war.

27.

Estanislao Oziewicz, Annan Proposes Definition of Terrorism, CIGI
(Mar. 21, 2005), http://www.cigionline.org/articles/2005/03/annan-prop
oses-definition-terrorism.
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certain caveat. 28 The Organization of Islamic Cooperation demanded
an exception for so-called wars of “national liberation,” i.e., if the
violence utilized is to further a “just cause,” such as the ambiguous
concept of national liberation, then acts of terror may be tolerated as
legitimate expressions of resistance. 29 In other words, the murder of
civilians or non-combatants is justified if the cause is just. Of course,
those familiar with the fifty-six member group already know that they
define terrorism internally to exclude Israelis as victims of terrorism
and exclude the terror groups Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorists. 30
Nevertheless, if a universal definition is not possible from the
global perspective, it is possible to at least list four key characteristics
of terrorism that better reflect the activity:
1.

The illegal use of violence directed at civilians to produce
fear in a target group;

2.

The continuing threat of additional future acts of violence;

3.

A predominately political or ideological character of the
act; and

4.

The desire to mobilize or immobilize a given target group. 31

Still, the terrorist attacks that have occurred over the past few
decades across the globe from Baghdad to Bombay have energized the
United Nations to produce a fairly significant variety of international
treaties making specific terrorist acts illegal. 32 If there is no
international definition of terrorism, then the acts themselves can be
criminalized, thus avoiding the harder and more contentious issue of
28.

U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development,
Security and Human Rights for All: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶
74–126, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005) (emphasizing why the
United Nations needs to address and define terrorism as a collective
body); see also Joshua Muravchik, Editorial, The U.N.’s Terrorism
Gap, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2005, at M5 (discussing Annan’s proposed
definition of terrorism and the Islamic states’ rebuttal).

29.

See Colum Lynch, Islamic Group Blocks Terror Treaty; Nations
Demand U.N. Pact Exemption for Anti-Islraeli Militants, WASH. POST,
Nov. 10, 2001, at A19.

30.

See Deborah Weiss, Commentary, Obama Excludes Israel from
Counterterrorism Group: Throwing an Ally Under the Bus, WASH.
TIMES, September 21, 2012, at B.

31.

ADDICOTT, supra note 20, at 61.

32.

See Murphy, supra note 7, at 465–73 (describing the piecemeal approach
via international treaties and conventions, bilateral agreements, and
regional conventions; currently, there are twelve international
conventions related to terrorism and ten criminal acts identified as
terrorism in various UN conventions and protocols).
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definition. Accordingly, bombing public places, hijacking aircraft,
taking hostages, and so on are all firmly identified as acts of
terrorism. 33 Echoing at least a hint of understanding that the targets
of terrorism are civilians, which are the central ingredient of terror,
whether the terror act occurs in peacetime or during war is irrelevant
to the element of criminality.
While the international community cannot agree on a definition of
terrorism that is palatable to a majority of its 193 members, it
appears that individual states have not been so constrained. The most
curious development associated with defining terrorism since the
September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States is the fact that
almost every nation in the world has adopted new “anti-terrorism
laws.” 34 According to a September 2011 survey conducted by the
Associated Press, over 120,000 people have been arrested and over
35,000 people worldwide have been sentenced and convicted for

33.

ADDICOTT supra note 20, at 61. Some examples of individual
international conventions that address acts of terrorism include: The
Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 704 U.N.T.S 220; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Oct. 14, 1971, 860 U.N.T.S.
105; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation, Jan. 26, 1973, 974 U.N.T.S. 178; Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Feb. 20, 1977, 1035
U.N.T.S. 167; International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages,
G.A. Res. 146 (XXXIV), U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N.
Doc. A/34/46 (June 3, 1983); International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, 2149 U.N.T.S. 284;
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, G.A. Res. 109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess. Supp. No. 49, U.N.
Doc. A/54/49 (Dec. 9, 1999); International Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism New York, G.A. Res. 51/210,
U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/59/766 (Apr. 4, 2005);
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of
Detection, Mar. 1, 1991, 2122 U.N.T.S. 359; Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms
Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304;
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 222; Protocol on the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 1589 U.N.T.S. 474;
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Mar. 3,
1980, 1456 U.N.T.S. 125; and Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 974
U.N.T.S. 178.

34.

See Martha Mendoza, Global Terrorism: 35,000 Worldwide Convicted
For Terror Offenses Since September 11 Attacks, HUFFINGTON POST
(Sept. 3, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/03/terrorismconvictions-since-sept-11_n_947865.html?view=print&comm_ref=false.
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terrorism offenses since 9/11. 35 In a survey of sixty-six countries,
China and Turkey accounted for over half of all convictions, with
Pakistan accounting for the sharpest rise in terror-related arrests in
recent years. 36 In the United States, the Associated Press found that
the number of arrests of individuals suspected of terrorism-related
activity was 2,934, 37 with 2,568 convictions. 38
At the end of the day, the most pressing matter in the era of the
War on Terror is the need for an international definition. Without
such, the term continues to be treated as a political piñata.
B.

American Definitions of Terrorism

Anyone marginally familiar with how American criminal law
addresses terrorism as a criminal act is cognizant of the fact that
there are a number of slightly different definitions of terrorism
scattered across a broad variety of federal statutes. In the United
States, definitional distinctions are made between domestic terrorism
and international terrorism. For instance, the Department of Justice
defines the term terrorism (referring to domestic terrorism) as “the
unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” 39 The
Department of Justice defines “international terrorism” as violent
actions that would be federal or state crimes designed to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population or government and that occur primarily
outside of the United States. 40
35.

See id.

36.

See id. Pakistan’s conviction rate for terrorism arrests sits at only 10%
of cases. Id.

37.

Id. But see ADDICOTT, supra note 20, at 130–31 (pointing out that the
number of prosecutions for major acts of terrorism or attempted
terrorism in the United States are far lower than for “terrorism-related”
activity).

38.

See Mendoza, supra note 34.

39.

28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (2010).

40.

See id. However, numerous federal statutes exist that offer slightly
different definitions of terrorism, for example:

(1) the term “international terrorism” means activities that—
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that
are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or
of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if
committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or
of any State;
(B) appear to be intended—
(i)

to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
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Perhaps the best source to consult for definitions from the
standpoint of the post-9/11 American perspective on terrorism is the
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA
PATRIOT Act). 41 Designed to increase the ability of law enforcement
and intelligence agents to address the threat of terrorist attacks, the
USA PATRIOT Act actually created no new laws. In order to better
counter acts of terrorism, the USA PATRIOT Act simply amends
existing federal laws to ease restrictions and streamline processes
regarding activities such as the lawful search of emails, telephone
records, financial transactions, and other records. 42 The USA
PATRIOT Act also enhanced America’s ability to detain and deport
certain aliens suspected of terrorist activities. To date, despite being
demonized by various ideologues, 43 no provision of the USA
PATRIOT Act has been overturned as unconstitutional by any of the
federal circuit courts.
In the USA PATRIOT Act, Congress set out specific definitions
for the terms “terrorist organization,” “international terrorism,” and
“domestic terrorism.” A terrorist organization is defined as one that
is:
(1) designated by the Secretary of State as a terrorist
organization under the process established under current
law;

(ii)

to influence the policy
intimidation or coercion; or

of

a

government

by

(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of
the means by which they are accomplished, the persons
they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale
in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (2009).
41.

Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified at 50 U.S.C §§ 18611863 (Supp. I 2001)) [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act].

42.

For a good discussion of the general provisions of the USA PATRIOT
Act, see John T. Soma et al., Balance of Privacy vs. Security: A
Historical Perspective of the USA Patriot Act, 31 RUTGERS COMPUTER
& TECH. L.J. 285 (2005).

43.

See, e.g., Heather Hilary & Nancy Kubasek, The Remaining Perils of
the Patriot Act: A Primer, 8 J.L. SOC’Y 1 (2007).
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(2) designated by the Secretary of State as a terrorist
organization for immigration purposes; or
(3) a group of two or more individuals that commits terrorist
activities or plans or prepares to commit (including
locating targets for) terrorist activities. 44

According the USA PATRIOT ACT, international terrorism
involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate the
criminal laws of the United States or any state, or that would be a
criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United
States or any state. These acts appear intended to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by
assassination or kidnapping. International terrorist acts occur outside
the United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of how
terrorists accomplish them, the persons they appear intended to
coerce or intimidate, or the place in which the perpetrators operate. 45
The phrase domestic terrorism is found in Section 802 of the USA
PATRIOT Act and is defined as a person who engages in actions:
(A) dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal
laws of the United States or any State;
(B) appear to be intended—
(i)

to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;

(ii) influence the policy of a government by intimidation
or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States. 46

If the acts occur outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States, they may be regarded as international terrorism.
Under the current American approach, whether from the view of
the Justice Department or the USA PATRIOT Act, the main
distinction between an international terrorist and a domestic terrorist
rests in geography. If the act takes place in the United States, then
the phrase domestic terrorism applies, regardless of whether the actor
44.

See USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 41, § 411(a)(1)(G).

45.

18 U.S.C. § 2331.

46.

USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 41, § 802.
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is an enemy combatant or a common criminal. A similar definitional
approach is found in 18 U.S.C. § 2331, where:
(1) the term domestic terrorism means activities that—
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of
the criminal laws of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended—
(i)

to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;

(ii) to influence the policy
intimidation or coercion; or

of

a

government

by

(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States. 47

Except in the limited context of military commissions, 48 the
Congress has not crafted a definition of terrorism where the language
turns on the status of the individual planning on, or embarking on, an
act of terror. Without such, the various definitions found in federal
criminal statutes are of little value in terms of rightly dividing the
unlawful enemy combatant who uses terror as a tactic of war from the
domestic jihadist who uses terror as a tactic of hatred.
C.

Enemy Combatant Versus Unlawful Enemy Combatant

The term enemy combatant is a phrase associated only with the
rule of law that regulates lawful behavior in an international armed
conflict. The term enemy combatant was used regularly by the Bush
Administration and has been adopted as a term of art in most federal
court cases which deal with detention issues, including the U.S.
Supreme Court. 49 In its broadest sense, the term enemy combatant
describes a person that is subject to the provisions of the law of war.
On those rare occasions when President Obama addresses the
issue of the enemy combatant, he prefers to use either a longer
descriptive term which identifies an enemy combatant as those
individuals who may be detained (or killed) as persons subject to the
congressional provisions of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military

47.

18 U.S.C. § 2331.

48.

See infra notes 73, 76 and accompanying text.

49.

See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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Force, 50 or the shorter phrase “unprivileged enemy belligerent” coined
by the Democrat-controlled Congress and found in the 2009 Military
Commissions Act. 51 When arguing before the federal courts, President
Obama apparently exercises his authority to detain enemy
combatants only under the congressional provisions and not as part of
his Article II powers as the commander-in-chief. 52 In the minds of
some, this reflects the attitude that only Congress has the power to
make war, 53 but President Obama does not necessarily hold this
view. 54 On other occasions, for instance, the Obama Administration
does employ Article II authority as one legal justification to conduct
targeted attacks by drone strikes. 55
Regardless of the Obama Administration’s reluctance to employ
the term unlawful enemy combatant, the very label of enemy
combatant is a direct byproduct of the corpus of the law of war and
has no real meaning outside of that usage. The law of war, also
known as the law of armed conflict or international humanitarian law,
consists of all of those laws, by treaty and customary principles,
which are applicable to international warfare, 56 i.e., when two or more
parties engage in armed conflict. Regardless of how an individual
state or party to the conflict chooses to declare war, the law of war
applies. The cornerstone of the law of war is the well-recognized
Geneva Conventions of 1949. 57 The Geneva Conventions cover four
50.

S. J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted). See also Respondent’s
Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, In re Guantanamo Bay
Detainee Litigation, No. 08-0442 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009).

51.

Contained in Title XVIII of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. 111–84, 123 Stat. 2190.

52.

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. The primary language setting out
executive authority is derived from Article II of the Constitution which
provides that the President “shall be the Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States.” Id.

53.

See Louis Fisher, Only Congress Can Declare War, ABA J., Feb. 2012,
at 37 (arguing that the President does not have the authority to “take
the country from a state of peace to a state of war”). See also U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.

54.

See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Attack Renews Debate over Congressional
Consent, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2011, at A14.

55.

See Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., Speech at Northwestern
University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2010), available at http://www.
justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html.

56.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 102 (1987) (explaining that customary international
law also makes up the law of war and consists of all those binding norms
practiced by nations).

57.

See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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broad categories of activity: wounded and sick military on the ground;
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked military at sea; treatment of
prisoners of war; and protections for civilians in war. 58
There is, of course, a difference between an enemy combatant and
an unlawful enemy combatant. Article 4(1) of the Geneva Convention
of August 12, 1949, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
defines the enemy combatant, in the context of prisoner of war, as,
“[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as
members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed
forces.” 59 Precisely mirroring the Geneva Conventions and all existing
international laws associated with the conduct of armed conflict, 60 the
U.S. Army (which has primary proponency over the other branches of
the military for the law of war) has codified all of the legal provisions
associated with law of war in Field Manual 27-10, Department of the
Army Field Manual of the Law of Land Warfare (FM 27-10). 61 The
law of war is focused both on the proper targeting of military
objectives and the treatment of enemy detainees, prisoners of war,
and other noncombatants. Accordingly, those who qualify as enemy
combatants are defined in FM 27-10 as “[m]embers of armed forces of
a Party to the conflict” or “members of other militias and members of
other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance
movements, belonging to a Party . . . provided that such . . . fulfill[s]”
four specific conditions: (1) that of being commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates; (2) that of having a fixed distinctive
sign recognizable at a distance; (3) that of carrying arms openly; and
(4) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war. 62
On the other hand, those who engage in wartime violence that do
not fulfill the legal requirements to qualify as enemy combatant
prisoners of war, if captured, are deemed to be unlawful enemy
combatants. 63 Since the prisoner of war status 64 is only conferred on

58.

See supra note 26 id.

59.

See Geneva Convention III, supra note 26, art. 4(1).

60.

See RESTATEMENT, supra note 56, § 102.

61.

DEP’T OF THE U.S. ARMY, FIELD MANUEL 27-10, THE LAW OF ARMED
WARFARE (1956). FM 27-10 affirms that the basic goal of the law of war
is to limit the impact of the inevitable evils of war by: “(a) Protecting
both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering; (b)
Safeguarding certain fundamental human rights of persons who fall into
the hands of the enemy, particularly prisoners of war, the wounded and
sick, and civilians; and (c) facilitating the restoration of peace. Id. ¶ 2.

62.

Id. ¶ 61.

63.

See infra note
commissions.

76

and

accompanying
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persons who are lawful enemy combatants, paragraph 60(b) of FM 2710 indicates that “[p]ersons who are not members of the armed forces
as defined in [the Geneva Conventions], who bear arms or engage in
other conduct hostile to the enemy thereby deprive themselves of
many of the privileges attaching to the members of the civilian
population.” 65
The friction in the analysis is that the al-Qaeda network is not a
“Party” to the Geneva Conventions, let alone a state; they are at
most non-state actors. Still, as non-uniformed combatants without
fixed distinctive signs that do not follow the law of war, al-Qaeda
members are properly classified as unlawful enemy combatants. As a
practical matter, since both groups can be killed and detained 66 in
accordance with the lawful use of force associated with war, the main
difference in treatment between an unlawful enemy combatant and a
lawful enemy combatant is related to interrogation issues. An
unlawful enemy combatant can be interrogated as long as the
techniques do not violate international law such as the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, 67 Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, 68 or
any other self-imposed domestic restrictions. In turn, the unlawful
enemy combatant, along with a lawful enemy combatant who

64.

Geneva Convention III, supra note 26 art. 17. Article 17 of Geneva
Convention III provides that prisoners of war are only required to give
their “surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army,
regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent
information.” Id. The prisoner of war is not required to give any further
information upon questioning. To leave no doubt on this point, Article
17 goes on to provide the following: “No physical or mental torture, nor
any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to
secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war
who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any
unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.” Id.

65.

DEP’T OF U.S. ARMY, supra note 61, ¶ 60(b).

66.

See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 523 (2004) (plurality opinion
holding that a U.S. citizen captured in combat operations in
Afghanistan could be detained as an enemy combatant).

67.

See G.A. Res. 39/46(I), U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N.
Doc. A/39/51, at 197 (Dec. 10, 1984). The Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment sets
out prohibited treatment by governments for all persons and the
universal rejection of “torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment throughout the world.” Although the
international convention provides a definition of torture in terms of
“severe pain or suffering”, it lacks any definition of “other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment.” Id.

68.

Geneva Convention III, supra note 26, art. 3.
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commits a war crime, can be prosecuted for war crimes by means of
military commissions. 69
The most significant byproduct of the Supreme Court ruling in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 70 was the passage of the 2006 Military
Commissions Act 71 (passed by a Republican-controlled Congress) to
authorize the prosecution of certain unlawful enemy combatants by
means of military commissions for listed crimes and war crimes. 72 Not
only did this law strongly refute all reasonable doubt that Congress
did believe that the War on Terror was a real war against al-Qaeda
and its direct partners, Congress provided a crystal-clear definition of
who qualified as an unlawful enemy combatant. Military commissions
were established by federal law and authorized to try “any alien
unlawful enemy combatant” (a non-US citizen member of al-Qaeda)
defined as:
(i)

a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has
purposefully and materially supported hostilities against
the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful
enemy combatant (including a person who is part of the
Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces); or
(ii) a person who, before, on, or after the date of the
enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, has
been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a
Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another competent
tribunal established under the authority of the President or
the Secretary of Defense. 73

Shortly after President Obama took office, the Democratcontrolled Congress passed the 2009 Military Commissions Act, 74
which provided some additional due process protections for the
accused and, for obvious political expediency, changed the 2006
Military Commissions Act phrase “unlawful enemy combatant” to
“unprivileged enemy belligerent.” 75 As noted, the two designations are
69.

See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat.
2600 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948a) (“An Act to authorize trial by
military commission for violations of the law of war, and for other
purposes.”).

70.

548 U.S. 557 (2006).

71.

See generally Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366,
120 Stat. 2600.

72.

Id. § 948b(a).

73.

Id. § 948a(1)–(2).

74.

Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1801–07, 123
Stat. 2190 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948a).

75.

Id. § 948a(6)–(9).
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identical in meaning and most still prefer the simpler phrase unlawful
enemy combatant over the unfamiliar unprivileged enemy belligerent.
The 2009 Military Commissions Act retained specific language
identifying an al-Qaeda member as an unlawful enemy combatant.
The 2009 Military Commissions Act defined its unprivileged enemy
belligerent in the War on Terror as:
[A]n individual (other than a privileged belligerent) [unlawful
enemy combatant] who—
(A) has engaged in hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners;
(B) has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against
the United States or its coalition partners; or
(C) was a part of al Qaeda at the time of the offense under this
chapter. 76

Although both the 2006 and 2009 Military Commissions Act can
be faulted for self-imposing an exclusion for U.S. citizen al-Qaeda
members as candidates for trial by military commission, both
congressional acts fully acknowledge the existence and validity of the
unlawful enemy combatant and that the proper rule of law to apply is
not domestic criminal law but rather the law of war. However, this
simple point of clarity never took hold in the Obama
Administration; 77 President Obama attempted to stop the military
commissions process immediately upon taking office. 78
The last major Supreme Court decision to deal with issues
associated with the enemy combatant in the War on Terror was the
2008 Boumediene v. Bush ruling. 79 In discussing habeas corpus rights
for alleged unlawful enemy combatant detainees at Guantanamo Bay,
Boumediene specifically used the term enemy combatant throughout
the opinion in a manner that directly mirrored Congress’ 2006
Military Commissions Act definition. 80 Without carving out an
exception for a U.S. citizen, the Court, adopting the executive
branch’s definition of the term enemy combatant, stated “an ‘enemy
combatant’ is an individual who . . . was ‘part of or supporting forces

76.

Id. § 948a(7).

77.

See Holder, supra note 1 (announcing the Obama Administration’s
intent to try Khalid Sheik Mohammed and four other individuals in
federal court for their role in the 9/11 attacks).

78.

See infra notes 123, 124 and accompanying text.

79.

553 U.S. 723 (2008).

80.

See e.g., id. at 732, 733, 734. See also Military Commissions Act of 2006
§ 948a(1)–(2) (defining an enemy combatant).
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hostile to the United States or coalition partners’ in Afghanistan and
who ‘engaged in armed conflict against the United States’ there.” 81
Despite the fact that various so-called “human rights” groups,
including the International Committee of the Red Cross, have
regularly accused the United States of violations of Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 82 for not
extending prisoners of war status to detained enemy combatants, 83 the
Bush Administration refused to apply both the Third Geneva
Convention Relative to Prisoners of War Protections as well as
Protocol I to unlawful enemy combatants. 84 In short, the Bush
Administration decided that said enemy combatants failed to qualify
as lawful enemy combatants under the applicable provisions of
international law. The Obama Administration has adopted the Bush
position in this regard. 85
Apart from the Boumediene decision extending habeas rights to
detainees at Guantanamo Bay to review their status as unlawful
enemy combatants, the most significant layer of due process
protections for current unlawful enemy combatants came in the 2006
Supreme Court ruling in Hamdan. 86 While Hamdan focused on the
detainees held at the military facility at Guantanamo Bay, all
unlawful enemy combatants (the Obama Administration now holds
most at the new multi-million dollar Bagram Air Force Base
Detention Facility in Afghanistan 87) are now entitled to the additional
81.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004).

82.

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1946, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.

83.

The legal basis most often asserted is that Additional Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 would accord prisoner of war
status to any enemy combatant—legal or unlawful. However, the United
States never adopted Protocol I, for the very reason that it bestowed a
legal status on non-uniformed combatants. Thus, the idea that Protocol
I is binding on the United States as a principal of “customary
international law” is correct only in part. The United States is not
bound by Protocol I in this regard and is perfectly within its legal rights
to interrogate non-uniformed combatants; these individuals are not
entitled to the protections given to prisoners of war. See id. art. 44.

84.

See Jason Callen, Unlawful Combatants and the Geneva Conventions,
44 VA. J. INT’L L. 1025, 1025–26 (2004).

85.

Addicott, supra note 9, at 350.

86.

See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).

87.

See Bagram Detention Center (Afghanistan), N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.
nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/b/bagram_air_base_a
fghanistan/index.html (last updated Nov. 19, 2012) (noting there are
over 3,000 people detained at Bagram, compared to 170 at
Guantanamo).
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protections of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 88
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions states in pertinent
part:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a
minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms
and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds,
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded
on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any
other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with
respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity,
humiliating and degrading treatment;

in

particular

(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of
executions without previous judgment pronounced by
a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples. 89

Attempting to add clarity to the issue of detention authority for
unlawful enemy combatants deemed to be “persons captured in
connection with hostilities” in the War on Terror, the National
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2012 (NDA FY 2012) 90
included a statutory definition of those individuals who would qualify
for indefinite detention. In section 1021(b) the NDA FY 2012, a
covered person includes:
88.

See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631–32.

89.

Geneva Convention III, supra note 26, art. 3(1).

90.

JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41920, DETAINEE PROVISIONS IN THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION BILLS 1 (2011).
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(1) A person who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored those responsible for those attacks.
(2) A person who was part of or substantially supported alQaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners,
including any person who has committed a belligerent act
or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such
enemy forces. 91

In summary, enemy combatant is a phrase that applies in time of
war and encompasses both the lawful enemy combatant and the
unlawful enemy combatant. Unlawful enemy combatants, like lawful
enemy combatants, may be killed on sight in accordance with the
proper targeting considerations. 92 If captured, the unlawful enemy
combatant, like the lawful enemy combatant, may be detained
indefinitely until the war is over. 93 Only the unlawful enemy
combatant may be questioned beyond name, rank, and serial number,
so long as the interrogation does not constitute an outrage “upon
personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment.”
The enemy in the War on Terror is properly designated as an
unlawful enemy combatant.
D.

Domestic Jihadist

Prior to September 11, 2001, and the start of the war against the
al-Qaeda terrorist organization, when one spoke of domestic terrorism
it was meant to describe the use of illegal violence by an individual
(or group of individuals) by means of an act of terrorism within the
physical territory of the United States—on the American homeland. If
apprehended, this individual was invariably prosecuted in a federal
district court for violation of various federal criminal law statutes
associated with the specific criminal act. 94 In the context of domestic
91.

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-190, § 1021, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011).

92.

See infra part IV.

93.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). See also Remarks by Alberto R.
Gonzales before the American Bar Association Standing Committee on
Law and National Security (Feb. 24, 2004), available at http://www.
abanet.org/natsecurity/judge_gonzales.pdf.

94.

See United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2nd Cir. 1999). The blind
Sheik, Omar Abdel Rahman, and eight other co-defendants were
convicted of various federal crimes for the 1993 bombing of the World
Trade Center in New York. All were motivated by radical Islam to
conspire and conduct the terror attack. See id. at 103–05.
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terrorism, nothing has changed. Regardless of the motivation, the
domestic terrorist who engages in criminal activity is treated under
the rule of law associated with domestic criminal activity. Since the
FBI is the lead authority for investigating terrorism, such a case is
almost always turned over to the federal government for prosecution
under federal law.
Understanding the reality that the number one threat facing the
nation emanates from domestic terrorists motivated by radical Islam,
the Obama Administration adopted the new term “domestic
jihadist.” 95 While this term is valid to describe those that violate
criminal laws to include terrorism statutes, it should not be used in
the context of enemy combatants.
Many Americans and non-Americans have been infected with the
virus of radical Islam. While these individuals are not valid al-Qaeda
members, it is certain that their religious beliefs cause them to
conduct or attempt to conduct terrorism on the soil of the United
States in the name of “jihad,” or holy war. 96 Of course, not all acts of
terrorism targeting America are caused by jihadists, but this
murderous movement of radical Islam eclipses all other individuals or
groups who employ terror. The ideology of radical Islam influences the
minds of individuals who, although not directly tied to the al-Qaeda
organization, choose to commit terrorist acts because they have
adopted the general theme and goal of al-Qaeda. 97 According to the
2013 Congressional Research Service Report (CRS) entitled American
Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat, a jihadist includes
any radicalized person who employs the religion of Islam to justify
terrorism. 98 Understanding that the jihadist targets domestic
audiences, the phrase domestic jihadist is a merger of terms.
According to the CRS Report, “homegrown” and “domestic” are
terms that describe terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the
United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent
residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States.99
The term “jihadist” describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an
ideological/religious justification for their belief in the establishment
of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and
religious leader known as a caliph. 100
95.

See BJELOPERA, supra note 10, at 5 n.3.

96.

See Jeffery F. Addicott, The Misuse of Religion in the Global War on
Terrorism, 7 BARRY L. REV. 109, 112–16 (2006) (describing the
motivation for jihadism as a distorted view of the grace mechanics of
Biblical Christianity to achieve salvation).

97.

See id. at 116.

98.

See BJELOPERA, supra note 10, at 1.

99.

Id.

100. Id.
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Even though the CRS Report ignores the fact that al-Qaeda
unlawful enemy combatants, who are obviously also jihadists, have
conducted attacks on the American homeland, illustrations of the
growing threat posed by jihadists that are not unlawful enemy
combatants are many and growing in number. Indeed, since the start
of the Obama Administration the pace of domestic jihadist-inspired
terrorism on U.S. soil has reached an all-time high. Between May
2009 and December 2012, “arrests were made in 47 ‘homegrown,’
jihadist-inspired” 101 terror plots. The most heinous attack by a radical
jihadist occurred in the cold-blooded murder of thirteen soldiers at
Fort Hood, Texas, in November 2009, by Army officer Nidal Malik
Hasan. 102 Because Hasan was in the military and the terror attack
occurred on a military installation, the Obama Administration’s
Department of Justice declined primary jurisdiction and allowed the
military to prosecute him under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. 103 As stated, in all cases of terrorism—whether motivated by
jihadist beliefs or some other cause—the Department of Justice has
the lead authority to prosecute under federal criminal law and the
FBI has the lead authority to investigate. 104 In fact, the federal
district courts have prosecuted (and continue to prosecute) jihadists 105
and other non-jihadist terrorists, such as Timothy McVeigh who
killed 167 people in a bomb attack in 1995.106
A continuing dilemma for the federal government in confronting
the threat of the domestic jihadist is that an overly lengthy
investigation of a particular terror plot may provide a window of
opportunity for the suspect to actually carry out the attack. In the
early years following the attacks of 9/11, this potential delay caused
the Department of Justice to officially adopt a policy of “anticipatory
prosecution” or “pre-emptive prosecution.” Fearing another
devastating attack similar to September 11, 2001, the government
sometimes moves in and arrests a suspected domestic jihadist at the
earliest possible opportunity in a given investigation, as opposed to
letting a particular terror plot mature. The downside, of course, is
that the suspect is often charged with lesser offenses or even offenses
101. Id.
102. Id. at 17.
103. UCMJ, art. 2(a).
104. See U.S. DEP’T.
12–13 (2012).

OF

JUSTICE, FISCAL YEAR 2012–2016 STRATEGIC PLAN

105. See ADDICOTT, supra note 20, at 525–44 (listing the “Islamic” terrorists
that were charged or convicted in U.S. federal courts between 2002 and
2010).
106. Mireya Navarro, At Fair for Survivalists, Fallout From Oklahoma, N.Y.
TIMES, June 12, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/12/us/at-fairfor-survivalists-fallout-from-oklahoma.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
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that have nothing to do with terrorism. A September 11, 2008,
Department of Justice document entitled Fact Sheet: Justice
Department Counter-Terrorism Efforts Since 9/11 explains:
In each of these cases, the Department [of Justice] has faced
critical decisions on when to bring criminal charges, given that a
decision to prosecute a suspect exposes the Government’s
interest in that person and effectively ends covert intelligence
investigation. Such determinations require the careful balancing
of competing interests, including the immediate incapacitation
of a suspect and disruption of terrorist activities through
prosecution, on the one hand; and the continuation of
intelligence collection about the suspect’s plans, capabilities, and
confederates, on the other; as well as the inherent risk that a
suspect could carry out a violent act while investigators and
prosecutors attempt to perfect their evidence.

While it might be easier to secure convictions after an attack has
occurred and innocent lives are lost, in such circumstances, the
Department would be failing in its fundamental mission to protect
America and its citizens, despite a court victory. For these reasons,
the Department continues to act against terror threats as soon as the
law, evidence, and unique circumstances of each case permit, using
any charge available. 107
There are a variety of federal criminal statutes that deal with
domestic terrorism, including the broadly written weapons of mass
destruction statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2332a. 108 The primary federal law for
prosecuting those accused of engaging in domestic terrorism is the
Clinton-era Material Support Act, which first appeared in the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. 109 Set out in
two sections, the Material Support Act makes it a criminal offense for
anyone to provide material support or resources in aid of terrorist
offenses or to provide material support or resources to a foreign
terrorist group so designated by the Secretary of State. 110 Knowingly
providing material support to terrorists is a crime under 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2339A 111 and providing material support or resources to a
designated foreign terrorist organization is also a federal crime under

107. Factsheet: Justice Department Counter—Terrorism Efforts Since 9/11,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Sept. 11, 2008), available at http://www.justice.
gov/opa/pr/2008/September/08-nsd-807.html.
108. 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (2004).
109. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2009).
110. See id.
111. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A.
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18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B. 112 To date, federal judges have largely upheld
the legality of the statute and numerous jihadists have been
convicted. 113 Despite complaints that the statute was overly broad
and vague in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 114 the Supreme
Court soundly rejected the idea that the Material Support Act was
unconstitutionally vague. 115

III. Mixed Signals—Blurring the Line Between
Domestic Jihadist and Unlawful Enemy Combatant
Since the inception of the War on Terror, the rule of law made a
dramatic shift from the well-worn processes of domestic criminal law
to the not-often-employed law of war. Congress authorized the
president (as the commander-in-chief) in the 2001 Authorization for
the Use of Military Force to use the law of war with “all necessary
and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons
he determines” were responsible for the terror attacks on 9/11.116 In
the Act, Congress gave the president unilateral power to determine
who is an unlawful enemy combatant. 117 Nevertheless, in the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Congress specifically identified those that
would qualify for treatment as unlawful enemy combatants—the
Taliban, al-Qaeda, and associated forces. 118 Similarly, in the Military
Commissions Act of 2009, Congress altered the phrase unlawful
enemy combatant to “unprivileged enemy belligerent,” 119 but still
clearly listed al-Qaeda as a belligerent, along with anyone other than
a privileged belligerent who engaged in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners. 120
Given that the War on Terror presents new challenges to the old
thinking associated with traditional forms of war in that the enemy is
not from a specific state, does not wear a uniform, and does not abide
by the law of war, it is still unacceptable that the United States has
112. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
113. See Norman Abrams, The Material Support Terrorism Offenses:
Perspectives Derived from the (Early) Model Penal Code, 1:5 NAT’L
SEC. L. & POL’Y 5, 9 (2005).
114. 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
115. See id. at 2719–20.
116. S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
117. See id. at pmbl.
118. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 48a, 120
Stat. 2600.
119. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 948a(5)–(6),
123 Stat. 2190.
120. Id. § 948a(7)(c).
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not been able to formulate at least the most basic of status
distinctions between an unlawful enemy combatant and a domestic
jihadist criminal. If instances of this confusion abound from the
leadership it is little wonder that the average citizen is left in a
constant state of total frustration.
While the Bush Administration certainly demonstrated mixed
signals in this regard, the Obama Administration has exhibited what
can only be described as a sycophantic approach. Beginning with a
pedestrian set of executive orders associated with enemy combatants
in early 2009, the Obama Administration has been unable or
unwilling to provide a bright-line distinction between domestic
terrorism conducted by domestic jihadists and acts of war carried out
by unlawful enemy combatants. 121
To be certain, the lack of clarity on treating the enemy
combatant exclusively under the law of war began in the Bush
Administration, not the Obama Administration. To its credit, when
the War on Terror began, the Bush Administration was able to shift
away from domestic criminal processes that had been used against all
categories of “terrorists” to include the case of Sheik Omar Abdel
Rahman, who orchestrated the 1993 radical Islamic terror attack on
the World Trade Center. 122 Both President Bush and Congress saw alQaeda and their direct supporters as unlawful enemy combatants and
subject to the law of war. Thus, President Bush exhibited a certain
degree of determination to employ the law of war consistently to
those whom he labeled as unlawful enemy combatants. As such, the
Bush Administration used the law of war against al-Qaeda forces to
kill them, detain them indefinitely, and to use military commissions.
Nevertheless, there were glaring exceptions where political
considerations, which demanded a demonstration of accomplishment,
trumped consistency in applying the law of war across the board. For
instance, while correctly proclaiming that the law of war allowed the
use of military commissions for those non-U.S. citizen al-Qaeda
members who committed crimes in violation of the law of war, the
Bush Administration chose to prosecute two al-Qaeda members in
federal district court: Zacarias Moussaoui (the so-called twentieth alQaeda terror plot hijacker of September 11, 2001) 123 and Richard Reid
(the British al-Qaeda shoe bomber). 124
121. See David Johnston & Elisabeth Bumiller, Obama’s Plan for Closing
Guantanamo Faces Legal and Logistical Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES, July 14,
2009, at A14; Tung Yin, “Anything but Bush?”: The Obama
Administration and Guantanamo Bay, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 453,
457 (2011).
122. United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 103–04 (2nd Cir. 1999).
123. United States v. Moussaoui, Indictment, No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. 2005).
Zacarias Moussaoui entered a guilty plea to charges that he conspired to
hijack planes and fly them into the World Trade Center and the
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The Bush decision to deal with Moussaoui and Reid as domestic
jihadists and not unlawful enemy combatants did not go unnoticed by
the Obama Administration. In the Obama Administration’s
continuing desire to marginalize the use of military commissions and
rely on domestic criminal courts for unlawful enemy combatants,
Attorney General Holder points out that President Bush “consistently
relied on criminal prosecutions in federal court to bring terrorists to
justice . . . attempted shoe bomber Richard Reid and 9/11 conspirator
Zacarias Moussaoui were among the hundreds of defendants convicted
of terrorism-related offenses.” 125 Of course, Holder falls into a logical
mouse-trap. While it is true that Reid and Moussaoui were al-Qaeda
unlawful enemy combatants, it is absolutely not true that the
hundreds of other defendants convicted of domestic jihadist terrorism
offenses were al-Qaeda. In other words, Reid and Moussaoui could
have been sent to Guantanamo Bay as unlawful enemy combatants to
await trial by military commission, but not the others convicted in
the Bush Administration. Only enemy combatants can be tried by
military commissions.
Instead of correcting the Bush-era missteps, and dealing with acts
of domestic jihadist terrorism based on the designation of the actor
into his proper legal category, President Obama’s confused policies in
the War on Terror have sown even greater consternation. Not only
does the president rarely make public announcements about the fact
that America is at war with al-Qaeda, 126 he seems intent on forcing a
Pentagon. See United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.2d 263, 266–78 (4th
Cir. Jan. 10, 2010) (discussing the procedural history); Moussaoui
Pleads Guilty to Terror Charges, CNN (Apr. 23, 2005), http://www.
cnn.com/2005/LAW/04/22/moussaoui/index.html. At the sentencing
stage of the three-year federal trial, a jury sentenced Moussaoui to life in
prison without the possibility of parole instead of the death penalty,
which the government was seeking; see Moussaoui, 591 F.2d at 277; see
also Moussaoui Formally Sentenced, Still Defiant, MSNBC (May 4,
2006), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12615601/.
124. United States v. Reid, 211 F. Supp. 2d 366 (D. Mass. 2008). Richard
Reid was convicted of attempting to blow up American Airlines Flight
63 from Paris to Miami on December 22, 2001 with a makeshift bomb in
his shoe. He was convicted of multiple life sentences in a federal district
court in December 2003. See also United States v. Reid, 369 F.3d 619,
619–20 (1st Cir. 2004) (discussing the procedural history); Exchange
Between Reid, Judge Follows Life Sentence, CNN (Dec. 6, 2003),
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/01/30/shoebomber.sentencing/.
125. Holder, supra note 55.
126. See President Barack Obama, supra note 5. One of the rare public
statements by President Obama that recognized that the United States
was at war with al-Qaeda occurred in the wake of the attempted plane
bombing by al-Qaeda member Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab in
December 2009: “We are at war. We are at war against al Qaeda, a farreaching network of violence and hatred that attacked us on 9/11, that
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return to the use of domestic criminal law to cover unlawful enemy
combatants, even if the terror acts occurred outside of the American
homeland. 127 The Obama executive orders referenced earlier provide
ample proof of this intent. Shortly after being sworn, President
Obama issued three executive orders on January 22, 2009. Obama
ordered: (1) the closure of Guantanamo Bay within one year; 128 (2)
the suspension of all ongoing military commissions; 129 and (3) the
suspension of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation program. 130 The first
two executive orders were rendered null and void in fairly short order.
As of this writing, Guantanamo Bay is still not closed and military
commissions have now been fully approved by the Obama
Administration.
In spite of these so-called setbacks in the Obama vision, the
Obama Administration still refuses to abandon its policy of using
domestic criminal courts whenever possible. Starting with the June
2009 transfer of al-Qaeda unlawful enemy combatant Ahmed Ghailani
from Guantanamo Bay to stand trial in New York federal district
court, where he was convicted on only one count for his role in the alQaeda terrorist bombings in Africa in 1998, 131 and continuing with the
trial of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, 132 the Nigerian national who
attempted to detonate an explosive device on an airplane traveling
from Amsterdam to Detroit on December 25, 2009, the Obama
Administration seeks every opportunity to downplay the use of the
law of war, particularly in terms of domestic prosecution. President
killed nearly 3,000 innocent people, and that is plotting to strike us
again. And we will do whatever it takes to defeat them.” Id.
127. See Charlie Savage, Developments Rekindle Debate Over Best Approach
for Terrorism Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2011, at A14 (discussing
the Obama Administration’s desire to use federal criminal law for
terrorism suspects in and outside the United States).
128. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4898 (Jan. 22, 2009); see
also Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4901 (Jan. 22, 2009)
(establishing a special task force on detainee disposition).
129. 74 Fed. Reg. at 4899.
130. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893, 4894 (Jan. 22, 2009).
131. Peter Finn, Guantanamo Bay Detainee Brought to U.S. for Trial,
WASH. POST, June 10, 2009, at A1. Ahmed Ghailani was transferred to
a New York District Court on June 9, 2009, despite bipartisan
opposition in Congress. This was the first case of a non-American
detainee from Guantanamo Bay transferred to U.S. soil to stand trial.
Id. Ghailani pleaded not guilty to multiple charges in connection with
the 1998 embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya. United States v.
Ghailani, 686 F.Supp.2d 279, 284–85 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (discussing the
procedural history).
132. Kevin Johnson, “Underwear Bomber” Trial Refreshed Security Debate,
USA TODAY, Sept. 30 2011, at 6A.
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Obama’s top counterterrorism expert, John Brennan, said that the
October 2011 conviction of the so-called underwear bomber,
Abdulmeutallab, in federal district court “showed why the
administration strongly believes that terrorism suspects arrested
inside the United States should be handled by the traditional system
[domestic criminal law].” 133
Perhaps one of the most egregious instances of confused
leadership in the Obama Administration occurred in November 2009.
Despite the fact that the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force
deemed that those responsible for the attacks of 9/11 would be
subject to the provisions of the law of war, 134 i.e., members of the alQaeda terror network, Attorney General Holder announced that five
of the most senior members of al-Qaeda—Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,
Walid Muhammad Bin Attash, Ramzi Bin Al Shibjh, Ali Abdul-Aziz
Ali, and Mustafa Ahmed Al Hawsawi—would be transferred from
military custody in the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
to stand trial in domestic federal criminal court in the Southern
District of New York for their roles in the 9/11 attacks. 135 This move
was roundly criticized for a variety of reasons: the phenomenal cost of
holding the trial in New York City, security considerations associated
with sparking violence by supporters of radical Islam, and continued
trauma to the families. 136 From the perspective of the rule of law, the
most serious concern was embracing and upholding the proper rule of
law—the law of war. 137 Holder seemed oblivious to the fact that the
five members of al-Qaeda had been detained for years in the
Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility without being charged with a
domestic federal crime. These five are not common criminals but
rather unlawful enemy combatants. Under the law of war, such
detention is perfectly lawful. The reasonable observer would therefore
expect that said unlawful enemy combatants would then be tried by a
military commission. The proper rule of law would neither suggest nor
support a domestic criminal trial.
133. Savage, supra note 127 at A12.
134. See Authorization for the Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 170th
Cong. § 2 (2001) (enacted).
135. Accused 9/11 Plotter Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Faces New York Trial,
CNN (Nov. 13, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/11/13/khalid
.sheikh.mohammed/index.html.
136. See generally Eugene R. Fidell, Op-Ed, The Trouble with Tribunals,
N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2009, at WK8; see also Charlie Savage, U.S.
Prepares to Lift Ban on Guantanamo Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011,
at A1.
137. See Morning Meeting with Dylan Ratigan (MSNBC television broadcast
Nov. 13, 2009), available at http://www.stmarytx.edu/ctl/index.php?
site=centerForTerrorismLawMedia#mediaArchives.

288

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012
Rightly Dividing the Domestic Jihadist from the Enemy Combatant

When Holder announced this ill-thought out decision, the Military
Commissions Act of 2009 (passed by the Democrat-dominated
Congress) had already been signed into law. Again, all unlawful
enemy combatants that had violated the law of war or other criminal
acts should be processed for prosecution by means of a military
commission, not a domestic criminal trial. Fortunately, the outcry
from the American people was so great that the Obama
Administration was forced to suspend the decision and finally, almost
two years later, in March 2011, the Obama Administration lifted its
self-imposed freeze on new military commission trials at Guantanamo
Bay. 138 Shortly thereafter, Attorney General Holder blamed Congress
for his lack of perspicacity and reluctantly announced that he was
“referring the cases [of the five al-Qaeda leaders] to the Department of
Defense to proceed in military commissions. Furthermore, [he]
directed prosecutors to move to dismiss the indictment that was
handed down under seal in the Southern District of New York in
December,j2009. 139
Even now, after the November 2012 election, the Obama
Administration seems unable to understand the gravamen of the
matter and simply will not concede the obvious: the proper rule of law
must be used exclusively vis-a-vis the proper actor.
The lengthy prepared remarks delivered by Attorney General Eric
Holder at Northwestern University School of Law in March 2012 did
absolutely nothing but add extra layers of misstatement and
confusion. 140 The speech was reviewed in some detail by various legal
commentators 141 because it provided the public with a rare
explanation of the Obama Administration’s position on a variety of
national security topics to include the legitimacy of the “reformed”
military commissions, the reauthorization of portions of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, the use of domestic federal criminal
courts, and the use of drone missile strikes to kill “terrorists” outside
of what Holder called the “traditional battlefield.” 142 While the
opening portion of the speech refreshingly and correctly stated that
“[w]e are a nation at war,” Holder quickly mired his remarks in
confusing rhetoric by failing to distinguish between the “terrorist,”
the “homegrown extremist,” and the “enemy belligerent.” Responding
to critics of Obama’s use of a domestic federal criminal court in
138. See Evan Perez, Obama Restarts Terrorism Tribunals, WALL ST. J.,
March 8, 2011, at A1.
139. Holder, supra note 1.
140. Holder, supra note 55.
141. See, e.g., Robert Chesney, Text of the Attorney General’s National
Security Speech, LAWFARE (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.lawfareblog.com
/2012/03/text-of-the-attorney-generals-national-security-speech/.
142. Holder, supra note 55.
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handling the case of Abdulmutallab, Holder all but conceded that
Abdulmutallab was in fact a member of al-Qaeda. Holder even
detailed how Abdulmutallab was carrying out an act of jihad by going
to the al-Qaeda training camp in Yemen where he met with a leader
of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and was given detailed
instructions on how to carry out the terror attack. 143 Nevertheless,
Holder simply lumped Abdulmutallab with other domestic jihadists
like Faizal Shahzad, the naturalized American citizen who tried to set
off a car bomb in New York City’s Time Square, and disingenuously
boasted about how both were convicted in federal domestic courts.144
Then, in the same paragraph of his remarks about Abdulmutallab,
Holder referred to other “homegrown extremists” that have been
convicted. Abdulmutallab was certainly not a homegrown extremist;
he was an unlawful enemy combatant.
The case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab should never have been
handled under the sphere of domestic criminal law. Once detained at
the Detroit airport, President Obama had every right to designate
Abdulmutallab an unlawful enemy combatant and to send him to a
detention facility in Afghanistan or Cuba for questioning and, if
appropriate, for prosecution in a military commission. Instead, the
President elected to employ the rule of law associated with domestic
criminal law for Abdulmutallab. Abdulmutallab knew he was an
unlawful enemy combatant; at his sentencing in February 2012,
Abdulmutallab loudly proclaimed that he was honored to be a
member of al-Qaeda. 145 As for Faisal Shahzad, he was an American
citizen and could not have been tried in a military commission even if
he were a member of al-Qaeda. 146 Finally, to add insult to injury,
Holder’s bait and switch logic regarding Abdulmutallab and Shahzad
barely raised an eyebrow from the law students or their Northwestern
law professors.
Although unlawful enemy combatants are clearly qualified for
killing or prosecution by means of military commissions, voices in and
out of the government still view federal criminal law as the proper
rule of law to apply, 147 resulting in massive levels of misstatement and
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See ‘Underwear Bomber’ Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab Handed Life
Sentence, THE GUARDIAN (UK), Feb. 16, 2012, http://www.guardian.
co.uk/world/2012/feb/16/underwear-bomber-sentenced-life-prison.
146. Holder, supra note 55.
147. See Walter Slocombe, Critical Consideration of US’ Approaches and
Methods of Treating Suspected Terrorists, in PERSPECTIVES ON
DETENTION, PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT OF TERRORISTS
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY AND CONDUCT 1 (Yonah Alexander et
al. eds., 2011) (“Much of [terrorist detention, prosecution, and
punishment] is illegal, immoral and even criminal.”).
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misunderstanding. 148 The term domestic terrorism can now have a
dual meaning, and so it must now be viewed in the context of
whether one is describing the terror acts of an unlawful enemy
combatant in the United States or the acts of an individual, e.g., a
non al-Qaeda domestic jihadist like Major Nidal Malik Hasan, who
commits a terrorist act in the United States in violation of a state or
federal criminal justice statute. 149 In other words, when viewed from
the lens of the War on Terror, the term domestic terrorism is best
defined based on the identity of the subject involved in the act. Is the
terrorist an unlawful enemy combatant or not? If he is an unlawful
enemy combatant, then the appropriate responsive rule of law to
apply is the law of war, not domestic criminal law.
In the media reports surrounding what happened on the tenth
anniversary of attacks on 9/11, the New York Times did not have a
single story in its Monday, September 12, 2011, newspaper concerning
the fact that the United States was engaged in a ten-year armed
conflict or war with al-Qaeda. Instead, all of the stories were cloaked
in the ambiguity of “terrorism.” The closest story to even attempt to
deal with the topic of the lawful use of violence in armed conflict was
entitled Around the World, Support for the U.S. is Mixed with
Fatigue and Regret. 150 The article talked about how nations from
around the world marked the date by “expressing their commitment
to democracy and the fight against terrorism.” 151 The article then
quoted a political analyst as saying that “most of Europe, the initial
sympathy for America after 9/11 was ‘followed by a lack of
enthusiasm . . . for the way 9/11 was exploited for political
purposes.’” 152 Such assessments should come as no surprise. As long as
the United States is unable to provide clarity under the rule of law for
its actions, the byproduct will be predictable: confusion.
Al-Qaeda unlawful enemy combatants qualify for treatment under
the law of war, regardless of where they are located in the world. The
Authorization for Use of Military Force contains no geographic
restrictions concerning making war against al-Qaeda. As the
commander-in-chief, President Obama has utilized the provisions of
the law of war to engage in warfare. Thousands of al-Qaeda, Taliban,
and associated forces have been killed by President Obama, mainly in
Afghanistan and Pakistan but also in other countries including Sudan,
148. Holder, supra note 55.
149. Nancy Gibbs, The Fort Hood Killer: Terrified . . . Or Terrorist?, TIME,
Nov. 23, 2009, at 27 (exploring if the killing at Fort Hood was an
“intimate act of war”).
150. Steven Erlanger, Around the World, Support for the U.S. is Mixed with
Fatigue and Regret, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2011, at A22.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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Yemen, and Somalia. President Obama has detained hundreds of new
enemy combatants at Bagram Air Force Base and continues to hold
approximately 165 enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.153
Attorney General Holder was correct in 2012 when he stated that
“our legal authority is not limited to the battlefields in
Afghanistan.” 154
Finally, to be sure, the United States has self-restricted the law of
war on U.S. soil, e.g., killing, detention, and prosecution by military
commissions. It is the policy of the United States that anyone
committing an act of terror on the homeland of America will be
initially dealt with under domestic criminal law. 155 Although
American citizens may be killed and detained if they are al-Qaeda
members, the Obama Administration has issued a signing statement
to the FY 2012 defense appropriations bill that “[President Obama]
would never let U.S. citizens be detained or interrogated under the
law of war.” 156

IV. Targeted Killing
In a report delivered to the United Nations Human Rights
Council, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions, defined targeted killing as “the intentional,
premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by States or their
agents acting under colour of law . . . against a specific individual who
is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator.” 157 Of course, the
rule of law that justifies a state killing another human being rests in
either the law of war or the long recognized customary international
legal right of self-defense. Illegal state killings conducted outside of
these two limited arenas are either murder 158 or assassination. 159 While
the term murder is easily separated from the discussion because it
generally applies to the use of force related to domestic criminal law,
the term assassination is often misunderstood and thus misapplied by
both policymakers and the media. Of course, this is somewhat
153. The Guantanamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES & NPR, http://projects.nytimes.
com/guantanamo (last updated Dec. 11, 2012).
154. Holder, supra note 55.
155. See Note, Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment, and War, 115
HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1225 (2002) (noting that the 9/11 attacks were
punishable under domestic law).
156. Obama’s Missing Detainees, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2012, at A12.
157. Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, ¶ 1
(May 28, 2010).
158. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 1114.
159. Id. at 130.
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understandable given that the current executive order prohibiting
assassination fails to even define the term. Executive Order 12,333
reads:
No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States
government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in,
assassination. 160

If one accepts the common definition of assassination to mean “to
murder (a prominent person) by surprise attack, as for political
reasons,” 161 then it is clear that Executive Order 12,333 does not make
illegal something that was once legal. In other words, murder is
always illegal. When the term assassination is used to describe a
killing, such as the public announcement in May 2011 that Osama
Bin Laden was killed, 162 it follows that one would automatically
presume that the killing was illegal.
Perhaps one of the best short reviews of assassination was penned
by W. Hays Parks, while he served at the Army Office of the Judge
Advocate General, International and Operational Law Division. 163
Parks made clear that the purpose of Executive Order 12,333 was to
ensure that the international community and the American people
understood that the United States does not condone assassination “as
an instrument of national policy.” 164 Nevertheless, Parks correctly
pointed out that as a matter of law, Executive Order 12,333 was not
designed “to limit lawful self-defense options against legitimate
threats to the national security of the United States or individual U.S.
citizens.” 165
The term targeted killing is most often associated with the use of
unmanned aerial Vehicles (UAVs), or drones, to kill unlawful enemy
combatants. 166 These attack platforms have been in use in the War on
160. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (Aug. 27, 2004).
161. Jeffrey F. Addicott, Proposal for a New Executive
Assassination, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 751, 760 (2003).

Order

on

162. Emily Babay & Brian Hughes, Crowds Rejoice at White House after
News of Bin Laden’s Death, WASH. EXAMINER (May 2, 2011),
http://washingtonexaminer.com/article/113539.
163. See Memorandum from W. Hays Parks, Special Assistant for Law of
War Matters to The Judge Advocate Gen. of the Army, Memorandum
of Law: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination (Nov. 2, 1989),
https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/conferences/targetedkilling/
papers/ParksMemorandum.pdf.
164. Id. at 8.
165. Id.
166. See Afsheen John Radsan & Richard Murphy, Measure Twice, Shoot
Once: Higher Care for CIA-Targeted Killing, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1201,
1201(2011).
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Terror for a decade. 167 The first targeted killing of an unlawful enemy
combatant outside of the active war zone of Afghanistan occurred in
November 2002 when a predator drone struck a car carrying AlHarethi and four others. 168 Al-Harethi was an al-Qaeda member and
suspect in the 2000 USS Cole attack in Yemen. 169
Since taking office, President Obama has demonstrated a
predilection for the use of drones to kill unlawful enemy combatants.
One commentator called Obama’s use of drones as a “remarkable
turnaround for a politician who had criticized almost every aspect of
the ‘war on Terror’ waged by his predecessor in the Oval Office.” 170
Under Obama, American drones have killed hundreds of suspected
enemy combatants, mostly in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but also in
Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. 171 From the time that Obama took office
in 2009 until early 2012, there have been over 240 drone attacks in
Pakistan alone, “with a death toll well over 1,300.” 172 The use of a
drone to kill deprives the subject of all his civil liberties. Unlike other
issues such as detention authority, interrogation, or trial, a targeted
killing provides no “appeal.” The goal is to kill.
The primary legal theory for the Obama drone attacks is that the
United States is at war. Unlawful enemy combatants are not killed
because they are necessarily guilty of a crime, but because they are
members of a hostile force. 173 Again, the unlawful enemy combatant
determination is made by the president, not by a court. Furthermore,
the candidate on the President’s “kill list” may also fall into the
category of “associated forces” of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In
Hamlily v. Obama, the D.C. Circuit court sided with the Obama
Administration’s view that the 2001 Authorization for Military Force
extended to “associated forces” of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. 174 In a
companion case, Bensayah v. Obama, the D.C. Circuit noted:

167. See Gabriella Blum & Philip Heymann, Law and Policy of Targeted
Killing, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 145, 151 (2010).
168. Id. at 150.
169. Id.
170. William Shawcross, Terror on Trial, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2012, at C1.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See Blum & Heymann, supra note 167, at 146.
174. See, e.g., Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F.Supp.2d 63, 75 (D.D.C 2009)
“Associated forces do not include terrorist organizations who merely
share an abstract philosophy or even a common purpose with al
Qaeda—there must be an actual association in the current conflict with
al Qaeda or the Taliban.” Id. at 75 n.17.
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[I]t is impossible to provide an exhaustive list of criteria for
determining whether an individual is “part of” al Qaeda. That
determination must be made on a case-by-case basis by using a
functional rather than a formal approach and by focusing upon
the actions of the individual in relation to the organization. 175

In addition to the standard targeting considerations of
proportionality, unnecessary suffering, and military necessity, it is
well established that noncombatants may be killed if incidental to a
lawful attack. 176 This concept is known as collateral damage.
While the military is authorized to conduct the actual killing, it is
well-known that civilian contractors and the CIA also provide input
in the intelligence gathering processes. 177 The CIA will not release any
information about their role in the use of drones, 178 but the primary
concern from a law of war perspective is whether or not the CIA and
other civilian contractors are acting in accordance with supporting
military operations in a defensive role and not actively participating
in offensive operations. 179
Even if the United States were not at war, targeted killing could
still be lawful under the longstanding concept of self-defense. In other
words, the authority to use violence in war exists in tandem with the
inherent right of state’s to defend themselves. The analytical
framework for the use of force is found in Article 51 of the UN
Charter, which codifies the “inherent right of self-defense.” The
inherent right of self-defense refers to the right of a country to
unilaterally engage in acts of self-defense; regardless of what any other
nation or organization, including the United Nations, may or may not
do. This is a well-known and ancient component of international law:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of the
right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present
175. Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
176. See Esther Hamutal Shamash, How Much is Too Much? An
Examination of the Principal of Jus in Bello Proportionality, 2 ISRAELI
DEF. FORCE L.R. 103, 106 (2006) (stating that the principle of
proportionality represents a compromise between military necessity and
the protection of civilians).
177. See Radsan & Murphy, supra note 166, at 444.
178. See id. at 446 (noting that the CIA is a clandestine organization).
179. See ADDICOTT, supra note 20, at 274–80.

295

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012
Rightly Dividing the Domestic Jihadist from the Enemy Combatant
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and security. 180

Parks sets out three different scenarios where self-defense may be
used: (1) in response to an actual use of force; (2) in pre-emption of
an imminent use of force; and (3) against a continuing threat. 181
Indeed, a prime example of this authority in action occurred on
August 20, 1998, when President Bill Clinton ordered a targeted
military strike on Afghanistan by means of more than seventy
Tomahawk cruise missiles in direct response to the August 7, 1998, alQaeda terror attack on the American embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania. 182
While the general legal basis for targeted killing is rather
elementary, the application in the War on Terror is often clouded due
to the utter failure of the government to set out the authority with
clarity. For instance, the confusion associated with whether the 2011
American “drone” killing in Yemen of al-Qaeda cleric and leader,
American-born Anwar al-Awlaki, was “legal” or not, reflects very
poorly on the political leadership of the United States. 183 Due to the
inability of the commander-in-chief to lucidly articulate a legal
justification divorced from political overtones, even people in the
United States found it quite easy to accuse the country of
wrongdoing. The New York Times editorial page on October 4, 2011,
carried six letters to the editor on the topic of al-Awlaki’s death. 184 Of
those six letters, only one of them understood that the killing was an
entirely lawful act carried out under the law of war. All the others
reflected varying degrees of confusion that included sentiments that
the United States was: (1) wrong for not operating under domestic
criminal law to arrest al-Awlaki; (2) wrong for killing a U.S. citizen;
or (3) that the rule of law didn’t really matter because al-Awlaki was
a “bad guy” and “we have to do what we have to do (the law of the
jungle).” 185

180. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
181. Parks, supra note 163, at 7–8.
182. Richard J. Newman et al., America Fights Back, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP’T (Aug. 23, 1998), http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles
/980831/archive_004624.htm.
183. See Greg Miller, Strike on Aulaqi Demonstrates Collaboration Between
CIA and Military, WASH. POST Sept. 30, 2011, http://articles.washing
tonpost.com/2011-0930/world/35272700_1_lethal-operations-cia-direc
tor-qaeda.
184. Letters to the Editor, The Killing of a Qaeda Leader in Yemen, NY.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2011, at A22.
185. Id.
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Amazingly, not a single voice in the Obama Administration took
the time to defend the action as lawful under a simple set of legal
parameters related to the law of war. Instead, the White House issued
statements associated with the fact that we were “defending”
ourselves against a terrorist, 186 even though the foundational rule of
law justification has nothing to do with the fact that al-Awlaki was a
“terrorist” or a bad person. The justification for America’s lawful use
of force against al-Awlaki was as follows: (1) the United States is at
war with al-Qaeda; (2) the law of war rule of law applies to this war,
not the domestic criminal law rule of law; (3) the law of war allows
the United States to kill on sight any unlawful enemy combatant,
detain indefinitely any unlawful enemy combatant, or use military
commissions when appropriate (unless the nation imposes selfrestrictions).
It took a full seven months after the killing of al-Awlaki before
Attorney General Holder finally offered his “thoughts” on targeted
killing at his March 5, 2012 address to Northwestern School of Law.
He indicated that the United States would kill by drone or otherwise
when: (1) the subject is located abroad; (2) the subject is a senior
operational figure; (3) the subject is a member of al-Qaeda, Taliban,
or associated forces; (4) the subject is involved in planning operations
focused on killing Americans; (5) the threat is imminent and an
opportunity to kill is open; (6) there is no feasible option for capture;
and (7) the use of violence will comply with the law of war. 187
In the case of Anwar al-Awlaki, if he was a member of al-Qaeda
(and he was), then he qualified for treatment under the full
parameters of the law of war. Thus, it is not a violation of the law of
war for the United States to kill an American citizen al-Qaeda
member without warning. In addition, if that American citizen is an
unlawful enemy combatant, then the United States can use the law of
war as the proper rule of law to deal with him. While it is true that
the 2006 (as well as the updated 2009) Military Commissions Act did
exclude American citizen al-Qaeda members from trial by military
commissions, this is a self-imposed rule, not a rule mandated by the
law of war.

V. Rendition
In tandem with the issue of targeted killing, the matter of
rendition has been a lightning rod for debate when used in the
context of the War on Terror. Simply put, rendition 188 refers to the
186. Holder, supra note 55.
187. See id.
188. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 1410 (defining rendition as
the “return of a fugitive from one state to the state where the fugitive is
accused or convicted of a crime”).
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long-standing practice of one state sending a non-citizen individual to
another state. 189 The practice is not illegal per se and the
government’s authority to engage in rendition stems from the
president’s authority under Article II. 190 The act of rendition only
becomes illegal under a limited set of circumstances. The seminal legal
instrument in this regard is the 1984 United Nations Convention
Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (Torture Convention). 191 Article 3 of the Torture
Convention prohibits any state party to “expel, return (“refouler”) or
extradite any person to another State where there are substantial
grounds to believe that he would be in danger of being subjected to
torture.” 192 The more common euphemism for this illegal practice is
“extraordinary rendition,” 193 although it should be properly
categorized as “illegal rendition.”
In making the determination as to whether an illegal rendition has
occurred, the state party is required by Article 3(2) to “take into
account all relevant considerations” with particular regard to whether
or not there exists “a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass
violations of human rights” 194 in the receiving state. Even though the
Torture Convention’s combined factors of “substantial grounds,”
coupled with “a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass
violations of human rights,” provide considerable flexibility for a state
189. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 670 (1992) (holding
that the practice of bringing a defendant into the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States by force is generally lawful per the KerFrisbie Doctrine).
190. See John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183,
1205 (2004) (“[T]he historical record unequivocally demonstrates that
the President has exercised unchallenged and exclusive control over
individuals captured during military operations since the time of the
Founding.”).
191. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, supra note 67, pmbl. (setting forth the
standards of treatment for all persons and the universal rejection of
“torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment throughout the world”). The convention provides a clear
definition of torture, although it is lacking any definition of “other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment.” See id.
192. Id. art. 3. See also Jules Lobel, The Prevention Paradigm and the Perils
of Ad Hoc Balancing, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1407, 1408 (2007) (discussing
the act of knowingly using rendition to a State that tortures).
193. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 1410 (defining extraordinary
rendition as “transfer, without formal charges, trial, or court approval,
of a person suspected of being a terrorist or supporter of a terrorist
group to a foreign nation”).
194. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, supra note 67, art. 3(2).
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party to justify a particular rendition, at least the prohibition is
established and a standard is established, albeit a subjective one.
Surprisingly, Article 16 has no similar requirement regarding rendition
to a state that engages in “other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment,” shortened to the term “ill-treatment.” For all practical
purposes, this means that a state is free to turn over an individual to
a state that it actually knows engages in ill-treatment. In practice, the
United States relies heavily on assurances from the host state via
diplomatic channels that the non-citizen will not be subjected to
torture or ill-treatment. 195
Because the Senate’s ratification of the Torture Convention
expressly mandated that the treaty was not “self-executing,”196
Congress passed legislation to implement Article 3 of the Torture
Convention as part of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring
Act of 1998 (FARRA). 197 Curiously, however, in terms of rendition
the FARRA only provided a policy statement without legal effect.
The pertinent provision states:
It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel,
extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any
person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for
believing that person would be in physical danger of being
subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is
physically present in the United States. 198

In the War on Terror, the concern over illegal rendition centers
on the transfer of an individual from the United States to another
country. 199 Since detainees are illegal enemy combatants, they are not
prisoners of war and thus not subject to protection of the Geneva
Conventions as a bar to any transfer whatsoever. Law Professor
Robert Chesney argues quite persuasively that because of the
definition of “protected persons” in the Fourth Geneva Convention,

195. See Roger Strother, Obama Administration to Continue Extraordinary
Rendition Program, Promises Oversight, OMB WATCH (Aug. 25, 2009),
http://www.ombwatch.org/node/10336.
196. See 136 CONG. REC. 36, 198 (1990).
197. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105227, § 1242(a)–(b), 112 Stat. 2691-761, 2681-822 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1231 note (2006)) [hereinafter FARRA].
198. Id. § 1242(a).
199. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 180–83 (1993)
(holding that Article 3 of the Torture Convention only applies to
transfers of persons from U.S. shores to another country).
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al-Qaeda, Taliban, and associated forces are not covered and thus are
all candidates for rendition. 200
While the Clinton Administration engaged in rendition of terror
suspects prior to 9/11, the Bush Administration engaged in lawful
rendition of detainees as well. According to the left-leaning Center for
Human Rights and Global Justice, however, the United States
engaged in illegal rendition by sending non-citizens to such countries
as “Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Syria.”201
Although candidate Obama strongly condemned rendition in the Bush
Administration when running for office in 2007, he quickly reversed
his position after the election and as a practical matter adopted the
entire rendition policy that he had so strongly condemned as torture
and illegal. 202 The 2009 Obama executive order condoned the practice
of rendition but promised more oversight in the process to ensure that
torture does not occur. 203 As a practical matter, over the past four
years, the Obama Administration has utilized the practice sparingly,
if at all. 204

VI. Conclusion
“During the Nuremberg trials, part of what made us different was
even after those Nazis had performed atrocities that no one had ever
seen before, we still gave them a day in court, and that taught the
entire world about who we are.” 205
—Barack Obama
While some may argue that the fault for the confusion associated
with unlawful enemy combatants versus domestic jihadi terrorists
rests with the lack of international consensus on relevant standards
that should be adopted to deal with “international terrorism,” the
root cause for this confusion actually centers on the inability of the
Obama Administration to properly distinguish al-Qaeda unlawful
enemy combatant terrorists from domestic jihadi terrorists. This
200. See Robert M. Chesney, Leaving Guantanamo: The Law of
International Detainee Transfers, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 657, 737 (2006).
201. ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK & THE CTR. FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, N.Y.U. SCH. OF L., TORTURE BY PROXY:
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW APPLICABLE TO “EXTRAORDINARY
RENDITIONS” 8 (2004).
202. David Johnston, U.S. Says Rendition to Continue, but With More
Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009
/08/25/us/politics/25rendition.html.
203. See Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 27, 2009).
204. Obama’s Missing Detainees, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2012, at A12.
205. Shawcross, supra note 170.
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confusion began in small measures in the Bush Administration but
has been magnified to absurd degrees in the Obama Administration.
Obama’s ill-conceived attempts to close Guantanamo Bay, stop
military commissions, prosecute senior enemy combatants in New
York federal district court, and generally refuse to acknowledge with
any regularity to the public that America is engaged in a real “war”
with al-Qaeda has produced massive distortion and consternation
about the legality of our actions.
The reason that all this matters, is that if the United States is
operating under the rule of law associated with domestic criminal law
vis-à-vis al-Qaeda, then America has engaged in horrid violations of
domestic and international law in the past eleven years by killing alQaeda members on sight, detaining al-Qaeda members indefinitely
without trial, and using military commissions to prosecute al-Qaeda
members. On the other hand, if America is in a real war, then all of
these actions are perfectly lawful.
The number one threat facing the United States comes from a
loose confederation of radicalized violent Islamic jihadists who engage
in terrorism as the preferred tactic of murder. Some qualify as
unlawful enemy combatants and some do not. While all al-Qaeda
unlawful enemy combatants can be labeled as “violent jihadists,” not
all violent jihadists are unlawful enemy combatants. In this light,
violent jihadists that do not qualify as unlawful enemy combatants
must be deemed as domestic jihadist terrorists, but violent jihadists
that do qualify as unlawful enemy combatants must be treated under
the law of war. Out of all of the nascent legal and policy issues
associated with the armed conflict against al-Qaeda, no factor has
spawned more debate than correctly applying this separation. The
inability to clearly set bright lines of distinction between al-Qaeda
unlawful enemy combatants and domestic jihadists is not just a
failure in definition, it is a failure in leadership and does tremendous
damage to America’s commitment to abide by the proper rule of law.
America must be able to clearly distinguish between criminals and
combatants and then apply the appropriate rule of law to each
category.
The distinction set out in this paper between an unlawful enemy
combatant and a domestic jihadist is not that difficult to delineate.
As the commander-in-chief, one of the president’s main roles is to
ensure that America acts under the correct rule of law. Because the
War on Terror is fought against a non-state actor, it is imperative
that the president make this distinction precise so that not only our
enemies understand that we are following the appropriate rule of law,
but the American people and our allies understand as well. Only then
can we validate our behavior as operating under the rule of law.
President Obama’s March 2011 executive order regarding the start of
new trials by military commissions and the legality of indefinite
detention is a step in the right direction, but it still sends confused
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signals because it leaves open the option to try unlawful enemy
combatants in federal district courts. Acting in accordance with the
new discipline of “lawfare,” coined by the Major General (US Air
Force, ret.) Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Executive Director, Center on
Law, Ethics and National Security at Duke University School of
Law, 206 clarity mandates that the commander-in-chief firmly
communicate the distinction between a domestic jihadist and an
unlawful enemy combatant, and properly apply the appropriate rule
of law in each and every instance. Only then can one speak
intelligently about rendition and targeted killing.
Considering that the hallmark of any democratic government is
its commitment to the rule of law, a rational discussion of the rule of
law vis-à-vis domestic terrorism means applying the appropriate legal
response to an attack (or attempted attack) on the American
homeland. This mandates a clear understanding of what one means
by domestic terrorism and which rule of law applies—domestic
criminal law or the law of war? The American government must do a
far better job in correctly dividing the application of the term when it
comes to discussions of violent jihadist threats.

206. See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving
Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts (Carr Ctr. for Human
Rts. Pol’y, Harvard Kennedy Sch. Program on Nat’l Sec. and Human
Rts., Workshop Paper, 2001), available at http://www.hks.harvard.
edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/Use%20of%20Force/Dunlap200
1.pdf.
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